This article first appeared in the Business Day on the 21st September 2006

Since the advent of democracy in South Africa the need to effectively manage the interface between money and politics has steadily climbed the policy agenda. Of course the much debated dismissal and looming trial of Jacob Zuma on charges of corruption has, regardless of the outcome, again provided evidence of the dangers that face politicians, and underlined, in the most dramatic way, the necessity of promoting mechanisms to protect the integrity of the country’s office-bearers and institutions. Within the context of a young democracy, the need to shield Parliamentarians from conflicts of interest, both real and perceived, is obvious and paramount.

Last Friday, Parliament’s Register of Members’ Interest was officially adopted and published. There is no doubt that the Register, the defining feature of the Parliamentary Code of Conduct, has, as intended, enhanced the image and integrity of the institution. There is also no doubt that awareness of and compliance with the requirements of the Code have steadily improved. Nevertheless, reviewing this year’s Register it is also fairly apparent that considerable work remains both in terms of promoting the purpose and particulars of the disclosure regulations in the Code as well as refining and strengthening the Code itself.

The Code of Conduct was first adopted in 1997 and incorporated as an annexure to the Joint Rules. As mentioned, the main feature of the Code is the Register in which Members are required to declare, on an annual basis, their private financial interests. Declarations include the number, nature and value of any share-holdings; the source of extra remuneration; any interest in property; details of foreign travel; and gifts and hospitality above the value of R 350. The Code also makes provision for a Joint Committee on Ethics and Members Interests’ whose function is to develop standards of conduct for Members; to serve as an advisory and consultative council concerning the implementation and interpretation of the regulations; and acting on its own or on receipt of a complaint, to investigate any alleged breach.

Since its inception, the Committee has had to deal with a range of complaints each year, some frivolous, others more serious. Amongst the cases of breach of the Code worth mentioning are those of the former ANC Chief Whip Tony Yengeni – although he resigned his seat subsequent to being found guilty of corruption and thus “escaped” the sanction of the Committee – the IFP’s Mandla Msomi; Winnie Madikezela Mandela and the Minister of Defence, Mosioua Lekota. More recently, the Committee had to investigate a host of Ministers and Deputy Ministers mentioned in an Auditor-General’s report for possible non-compliance with disclosure regulations in the public sector.

These cases notwithstanding, it has been pointed out that there are a number of obvious weaknesses in the Code which have served to reduce the ability of the Committee and Parliament to respond to, and guard against, impropriety. One the obvious limitations, is the non-existence of severe penalties for non-compliance. Although the initial emphasis of the Code was preventative rather then punitive, the current sanctions at Parliament’s disposal including temporary suspension, forfeiture of part of a salary or a reprimand by the Speaker, are clearly insufficient.

The other significant shortcoming is the lack of pro-active and regular monitoring of the Register, whether by Parliament or the general public.
After 2004 it emerged that a former Member of the National Assembly was, whilst serving as Member, receiving remuneration as a doctor in a provincial hospital – this despite Section 47 of the Constitution which asserts that: “Every citizen …is eligible to be a Member…except anyone who is appointed by, or in the service of the state and receives remuneration for that appointment or service….” The Member had repeatedly disclosed this information, from 1997 to 2004, but the irregularity was only detected after he left. Although this case was not one of a conflict of interest but rather eligibility, the fact that this information was in the Register and went unnoticed for seven years is worrying to say the least.
This year, with the publication of the aforementioned report by the Auditor-General, an argument could be made that if Members interests where regularly checked, an embarrassing situation in which senior Parliamentarians suddenly had to face doubts over their integrity could have been avoided. There are, of course, a number of questions over who should be monitoring Members’ interests and what role, if any, the Committee should play. The point remains, however, that as things stand, it is difficult to assert, with any great confidence, that there are no current Members who have undisclosed gifts or substantial interests that could be construed as generating a conflict of interest.

The Committee is well aware of these problems and has, commendably, undertaken to review the Code and “host a series of workshops within Parliament to promote debate on the issue of ethics and examine various systems of accountability for elected representatives.” Amongst the proposals being considered is the introduction of ethical standards or principles which Members would be expected to adhere to. This would, in effect, make the Committee an “Ethics” Committee and not simply a Committee on “Members’ Interests” as is currently the case. How such standards would be enforced is another matter that would need to be carefully examined.

To date, whilst there is certainly evidence of a growing awareness around the Code and a willingness to enforce its provisions, it is also clear that with more stringent sanctions and scrutiny, the Code could become a far more incisive, meaningful and effective instrument and thereby further advance and safeguard the standing of South Africa’s Parliament.

PERRAN HAHNDIEK IS A RESEARCHER WITH IDASA'S POLITICAL INFORMATION & MONITORING SERVICE (PIMS)